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Compared to expertise in other domains, moral expertise remains a controversial topic. The 
current research employed a folk-psychological approach to explore which characteristics 
laypeople consider to be essential for moral expertise. Study 1 indicates that laypeople 
associate moral experts with a virtuous character and other-oriented behavior. Formal 
qualifications such as education and training are seen as less important for moral experts 
compared to other kinds of experts (Study 2a). However, professional judges––suggested by 
laypeople as moral experts––neither attributed the suggested characteristics of a moral expert 
to themselves, nor do they strongly believe in the existence of moral expertise (Study 2b). 
Finally, Study 3 adopted a more confirmatory approach and substantiated the key finding that 
laypeople expect moral experts to be rather virtuous than formally qualified, whereas for 
medical experts––as a comparison group––the reversed pattern emerged. Additionally, the 
difference between both characteristics was smaller for a moral than for medical experts. 
Taken together, laypeople seem to expect a more complex and balanced set of skills from a 
moral expert than from experts in other domains: moral experts need not only know about 
what is moral, but they also need to be moral. 
 













Moral issues are not easy to solve. Consequently, people confronted with difficult 
moral situations may seek the help of someone, whom they perceive to be an expert in these 
matters. In his weekly column in a popular German newspaper, the “moral expert” Dr. Dr. 
Erlinger––who holds doctorates in both medicine and law––offers solutions to moral 
dilemmas like: “My son died and I found his diaries. Can I read them?”, “My partner really 
wants to get married, but I’m completely against marriage in general. How should we deal 
with this situation?”, or, “An extremely disliked and condescending colleague became very 
sick all of the sudden and now needs assistance to get to the office. Is it my moral obligation 
to help him, although I cannot stand him?” But why does the public trust Erlinger to have 
reasonable answers to their moral problems? What makes him––or anybody––an expert on 
moral decision-making? Is it his qualification (the two doctorates) or is it something else that 
makes him an expert on these issues?  
Experts in any field are thought to make superior decisions, because they are highly 
knowledgeable and skilled information processors (Ericsson & Smith, 1991; Reyna & L loyd, 
2006; Salas, Rosen, & DiazGranados, 2010; Ste-Marie, 1999). Experts are also competent 
across complex situations and continuously excel in their area of expertise (Ericsson & Smith, 
1991). Through extensive training they obtain efficiency and a low error rate (for a review on 
expertise, see Salas et al., 2010). It is therefore reasonable to expect a good solution from the 
sought-out expert for moral dilemmas like the ones described above. However, moral 
expertise has a unique set of problems, which other expertise fields do not have: it lacks well-
defined identification standards. Specifically, it is unclear, in which domain the expert needs 
to have knowledge in or what type of experience is necessary for the expertise to develop. 
Beyond that, it is also unclear whether or not expertise can even exist in areas that do not offer 
objective answers (Archard, 2011; Gordon, 2014). In other domains, especially in sports but 
also in natural science, expertise can be measured by performance. For instance, a tennis 




player either wins or loses a match; a chemist either succeeds or fails at an experiment; a 
mathematician either solves a problem or the problem remains unsolved. Therefore, some 
scholars have concluded that moral expertise simply cannot exist, because moral issues lack 
that definitive answer (McGrath, 2008). Certainly, for some moral issues, there seems to be a 
clear and correct answer. For example, people probably agree that stealing, lying or cheating 
is immoral behavior. Y et, more complex moral situations such as the ones described in the 
beginning are not as easy to solve, and these are the ones where moral expertise might be 
needed the most. Similarly, the moral dilemmas described by Foot (1967) also do not have 
one right answer, but they instead pit different response inclinations (e.g., deontological and 
utilitarian judgments) against each other. Since people most likely do not seek out assistance 
in the simple cases, performance of moral experts matters most in the latter cases, which, as 
previously stated, cannot be assessed satisfactorily. 
L ikewise, accurate feedback is also not possible then. According to well-established 
conceptualizations of expertise (Ericsson, K rampe, & Tesch-Römer, 1993; Ericsson & 
Lehmann, 1996; Ericsson & Smith, 1991; Holyoak, 1991), the lack of feedback makes moral 
expertise unlikely to develop to a high standard, because behavior cannot be adapted without 
it.  
A ll these uncertainties aside, people still seek out the help of moral experts or put them 
in charge of ethical boards. Scientific debates about the existence and definition of moral 
expertise notwithstanding (Archard, 2011; Gordon, 2014; Schwitzgebel & Cushman, 2012; 
Singer, 1972), we propose that considering the perspective of laypeople on the issue is an 
empirically overlooked but fruitful approach to the study of moral expertise. Examining the 
folk psychology of moral expertise might inform our understanding of the phenomenon and 
people’s motivations to seek the advice of such experts. 
 




L ay Beliefs in Moral E xpertise 
 In the current research, we adopt a framework at the intersection of social-cognitive 
science, philosophy, and folk psychology (K nobe et al., 2012). This approach has identified a 
host of different beliefs and theories about the world that are held by laypeople (see Zedelius, 
Müller, & Schooler, 2017, for a recent overview). These beliefs span from rather tangible 
phenomena to metaphysical problems such as how minds relate to bodies (e.g., Forstmann & 
Burgmer, 2015, 2017) or whether minds are free (Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer, & Turner, 
2005). Importantly, no matter how abstract these lay beliefs might be, they often have tangible 
outcomes in more applied settings, such as health behavior (Burgmer & Forstmann, 2018; 
Forstmann, Burgmer & Mussweiler, 2012), or morality (Shariff et al., 2014; V ohs & 
Schooler, 2008). 
 In a similar vein, people should also entertain such lay beliefs about morality and 
issues within the moral domain. After all, morality is viewed as most central to the self 
(Strohminger & Nichols, 2014), and it is a dimension that has great impact on how we 
perceive other people, and how we act towards them (e.g., Goodwin, Piazza, & Rozin, 2014). 
In fact, as we go about our daily lives, we deal with moral issues on a constant basis––when 
we ourselves act (im)morally, become the target of such behavior, or evaluate it (Hofmann, 
Wisneski, Brandt, & Skitka, 2014). Furthermore, people moralize the essence of a person, that 
is, his or her true self, when conceiving of it as fundamentally good (Newman, Bloom, & 
K nobe, 2014). Similarly, research at the intersection of philosophy and psychology has 
repeatedly demonstrated the importance of morality in shaping our basic psychology (K nobe, 
2010). 
 Despite this obvious importance of morality in our everyday life, there is a surprising 
lack of empirical research into its conception by laypeople. Some studies have examined the 
influence of laypeople’s incremental versus entity theories on how the perception of moral 
character influences trust recovery following a transgression (Haselhuhn, Schweitzer, & 




Wood, 2010), and others have explored laypeople’s construal of moral phenomena such as 
lying (Wiegmann, Samland, & Waldmann, 2016), or people’s inclinations to think of “good” 
and “bad” in terms of actual forces (Bastian et al., 2015).  
 However, to our knowledge, no empirical research has been conducted yet into the 
questions of whether or not laypeople entertain the notion of moral expertise, what such 
beliefs in moral expertise might look like, and how these might extend our knowledge of the 
phenomenon. We conducted the present research to address these open questions. We believe 
that a folk-psychological perspective on moral expertise can be fruitful, as has been the case 
for other controversial topics at the intersection of philosophy and psychology such as the 
free-will debate (Monroe & Malle, 2010; Nahmias et al., 2005). 
T wo Approaches to Moral E xpertise 
In order to theoretically structure the topic, J ones and Schroeter (2012) have noted that 
there are two main approaches to the conceptualization of moral expertise. The first approach, 
the intellectualist model, focuses on moral-reasoning and decision-making skills (e.g., Singer 
& Wells, 1984). The second approach, the practical wisdom model, dismisses such an attempt 
of establishing superior moral decision making through formal qualification in the moral 
domain. Rather, moral expertise has little to do with abstract moral knowledge but with moral 
virtues acquired through experience (e.g., J ones & Schroeter, 2012). Here, we rely on the 
distinction between intellectualist and practical-wisdom models as a starting point to explore 
whether laypeople’s intuitions about moral expertise can be broadly categorized accordingly.  
T he Intellectualist Model 
 According to the first approach, moral expertise is classified as the knowledge of the 
appropriate moral principles, well developed reasoning skills, and the capacity to identify 
fallacies (e.g., Singer & Wells, 1984). Here, moral expertise is about knowing the rules and 
applying them correctly. Moral decision-making also includes the gathering of information, 
the selection of relevant information, the combination of that information with a basic moral 




position, and the elimination of biases (Singer, 1972). Singer (1972) argues that someone who 
is familiar with moral concepts and moral arguments, and someone who also has the time and 
motivation to perform the information search and reasoning, is expected to reach sound 
conclusions. This notion is in line with the conceptualization of expertise, in which expertise 
is achieved through prolonged periods of experience and focused practice (Salas et al., 2010). 
Reasoning, logical thinking and moral concepts can be studied and improved through 
practice; thus, people should also be able to acquire expertise in the moral domain.  
Consequently, philosophers could be classified as moral experts, because the described 
skill set matches the skill set a philosopher obtains during his studies. Y et, there are strong 
debates about philosophers’ suitability as moral experts. On the one hand, there are theoretical 
discussions (Archard, 2011; Gordon, 2014; Singer, 1972). On the other hand, experimental 
philosophers and psychologists have started to examine the decisions of philosophers to 
determine their quality. Since performance cannot be measured by outcome if no objectively 
correct answer exists in the moral domain (Archard, 2011; Gordon, 2014), the outcome by 
itself does not allow to draw any conclusions about expertise (Weinberg, Gonnerman, 
Buckner, & Alexander, 2010). Using various moral dilemmas, it was investigated whether 
philosophers’ decisions remain uninfluenced by the order in which the moral problems are 
presented. One might expect that moral experts would be immune to such potential order 
biases. Results, however, indicated that philosophers’ judgements were by no means unbiased 
(Schwitzgebel & Cushman, 2012, 2015; Tobia, Buckwalter, & Stich;Wiegmann & Okan, 
2012; Wiegmann, Okan, & Nagel, 2012).   
  However, biased judgments also occur in many other domains of expertise (e.g., 
Choudhry, Fletcher, & Soumerai, 2005; Englich & Mussweiler, 2001;  Rachlinski, Guthrie, & 
Wistrich, 2007; Schmittat & Englich, 2016; Shanteau & Stewart, 1992). Consequently, the 
philosophers’ documented biases are neither an argument against the existence of moral 
expertise, nor against the proposition that philosophers are indeed moral experts. Taken 




together, relying on presumed moral experts’ answers to determine the existence of moral 
expertise does not seem to be a fruitful approach.  
Practical Wisdom Model 
The second approach to defining moral expertise does not imply a specific education 
or particular training that leads to a superior decision-making process, but this approach 
focuses on practical wisdom. Here, having virtue is the most central part of being a moral 
expert (Jones & Schroeter, 2012). This is nothing that can be acquired through studying, but 
only through habituation and experience (see also Dancy, 1993). As Hulsey and Hampson 
(2014) but also Narvaez and colleagues (Narvaez, 2010; Narvaez & Gleason, 2007; Narvaez 
& Lapsley, 2005) have proposed, moral expertise can develop from habit. Tailoring 
appropriate responses to moral environments leads to habits, which are then integrated into 
one’s moral identity. Ultimately, this leads to moral expertise, which Hulsey and Hampson 
characterize as “deeper and better-integrated moral knowledge, a keener grasp of which 
actions are appropriate to a given situation, and faster and more nuanced moral responses” 
(2014, p. 1). In other words, our actions shape how we see ourselves, and this behavior then 
strengthens those beliefs that led to the initiation of said action. This pattern of action then 
becomes the basis of our moral identity (Hulsey & Hampson, 2014); or with Aristoteles 
words: we become virtuous by acting virtuously (as summarized in Bowditch, 2008),  
According to this approach, laypeople should seek out virtuous persons for moral 
advice, because if a person comes across as mostly driven by moral virtues and by moral 
principles (as opposed to outcomes), they are also perceived as more trustworthy (Everett, 
Pizarro, & Crocket, 2016) and warmer (Rom, Weiss, & Conway, 2017). Furthermore, 
signaling a more visceral and affect-based (as opposed to abstract and cognition-based) 
moral-reasoning process entails weaker ascriptions of self-righteousness (Weiss, Rom, 
Burgmer, & Conway, 2019). Thus, laypeople may overall be more likely to seek out moral 
help from such a virtuous expert––presumably because they also expect this expert to practice 




what he or she preaches. Consistently, laypeople may attribute the moral qualities that a priest 
preaches about to his or her character as well, thus ascribing moral virtues to him or her, 
which in turn may qualify priests to be moral experts under the practical-wisdom perspective 
(see Rossano, 2008, for a similar argument).  
Taken together, consistent with the first approach to moral expertise (i.e., 
intellectualist model), laypeople may particularly appreciate the formal education and training 
of presumed moral experts such as Erlinger and therefore trust his judgment. Despite the fact 
that he is not a philosopher, but a lawyer and a medical doctor, laypeople might infer that he 
knows and applies moral rules correctly. A lternatively, and consistent with the second 
approach to moral expertise (i.e., practical-wisdom model), experts like Erlinger may be 
perceived by laypeople as moral persons with virtuous characters who have acquired moral 
wisdom through moral experience. What exactly deem moral advice-seekers important then: 
education and training, or a specific set of characteristics such as a virtuous character, or a 
combination of these? We designed the current research to empirically address this question.  
Present R esearch 
As has become evident, different theoretical and empirical approaches to moral 
expertise have yet to reach a conclusion what moral expertise actually is. However, advice 
from moral experts––granted that this kind of expertise does in fact exist––is frequently 
sought by laypeople, that is, by those who are most likely not familiar with the scientific 
discourse revolving around moral expertise. As we argue here, laypeople’s perspective on the 
issue might inform our knowledge of the nature of moral expertise and shed light on people’s 
motivations to seek or not seek this kind of expertise.   
In a first exploratory study using an open-ended response format, we investigated folk 
beliefs about moral expertise and the characteristics that laypeople associate with this kind of 
expertise (Study 1). Building on these initial findings, in Study 2a, we randomly assigned 
participants to one of four expert-group conditions (i.e., moral vs. philosophy vs. science vs. 




medical expertise) and asked how strongly they associate particular characteristics (derived 
from Study 1) with the respective group of experts. Based on results from Study 1, we 
hypothesized that moral expertise is more strongly associated with personality characteristics 
than with formal qualifications such as education or training compared to the other expertise 
groups. Study 2b applied the same survey to a group of civil and criminal-law judges, who 
were among the suggested moral expertise professions in Study 1. The aim of Study 2b was to 
explore whether so-called moral experts perceive themselves to be moral experts, thus, 
whether they ascribe the same characteristics to themselves as laypeople do. Finally, Study 3 
aimed to clarify the qualifications-virtues debate by having participants rate how much formal 
qualification compared to virtuous character a moral expert should have compared to a 
medical expert. It was hypothesized that a virtuous character trumps formal qualification for 
moral experts, but that this pattern would be reversed for medical experts.  
Study 1 
How do laypeople construe moral expertise? 
 Based on the literature on expertise and moral decision-making, we composed a 
number of questions to explore how laypeople construe moral expertise. For instance, how do 
laypeople define moral expertise and how do they characterize a moral expert? Additionally, 
this study explores whether or not laypeople actually believe in the existence of moral 
expertise. Study 1 also serves as the basis for the subsequent study that compares moral 
expertise to other kinds of expertise in a more systematic fashion. 
Method 
 Participants and design. We recruited 50 adults from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk) for a study on “perception of morality” in exchange for monetary compensation. 
This study was a pilot study that was used to generate hypotheses and material for the subsequent 
studies. It was not a confirmatory, but a purely explorative study. Since the goal was to generate 
and code verbal material and, consequently, no inferential statistical tests needed to be performed, 




a sample size of N = 50 was deemed sufficient for this initial pilot study. An attention check item 
(i.e., “To monitor data quality, please move the slider to the number two”) was included to 
ensure data quality. Three participants failed this attention check and were removed from 
analysis. The final sample thus comprised 47 participants (21 females, 26 males; MAge = 
31.96, SD = 9.73) A ll participants answered the same set of questions in the order described 
below.  
 Materials and procedure. Participants were informed that the survey is about the 
perception of moral expertise and that they should provide spontaneous and honest answers to 
the questions. They were informed that keywords were allowed, but that the answers still 
needed to be interpretable. Four open questions were asked: 1) how would you explain what a 
moral expert is [without using the words “moral” and “expert”]? The phrasing of this 
question aimed to minimize answers like “an expert in morality”. This type of explanation 
would be uninformative and without any explanatory power, because it does not go beyond its 
disposition. 2) Which characteristics/features do you associate with moral experts? 3) Please 
name a group of experts from a different domain. What do these experts have in common with 
moral experts? What distinguishes them from moral experts? 4) Please list some examples of 
which groups/professions you consider to be moral experts. There were no time or space 
restrictions for participants’ responses. Afterwards, participants were asked to rate the 
importance of twelve characteristics for moral experts on a nine-point L ikert-type scale (1 =  
not at all important, 9 =  very important): reliance on deliberation, intuition, broad general-
knowledge, knowledge of human nature, integration into society, above average IQ, degree in 
philosophy, experience in moral decision-making, highly educated, efficient information 
processing skills, overall good personality and politically neutral. These items were presented 
in a fixed randomized order. Finally, participants were asked to indicate whether they thought 
moral expertise is in fact a “real expertise” (yes, no, not sure) followed by some final 
demographic questions.  





Open-ended questions. Some participants responded with only one keyword per 
questions, others provided more extensive answers, which we then coded into individual 
‘units of meaning’ (Joffe & Y ardley, 2004; Seuntjens, Zeelenberg, Breugelmans, & van de 
V en, 2014, see SOM for responses and coding). There were no missing data; every single 
participant responded to each question. 
Definition of moral expertise. The first question asked participants to explain moral 
expertise (N = 54 units of meaning). A  great number of participants (n = 17) defined moral 
experts as “someone who knows what is right and what is wrong” or as “someone who knows 
the difference between good and bad” or semantically related definitions. Other responses 
included knowledge and wisdom (n = 11), a great character (n = 6), educated in the domain (n 
= 4), decision-making skills (n = 4), experience and practice (n = 3), general descriptions such 
as “judges”, “pope” (n = 6), and other responses (n = 3).  
Characteristics of moral experts. The second question asked participants to list 
specific features and characteristics of moral expertise (N = 137, see supplementary materials 
for a complete list of the responses). About one third of the answers described moral experts 
as moral persons (n = 47), including characteristics such as being a good role model, nice, 
good natured and knowing the rules. This was followed by characteristics related to other-
oriented behavior such as empathy and selflessness (n = 35) and characteristics related to 
intelligence and education (n = 25). Other characteristics related to decision-making (e.g., 
“analytical”, “logical”, “reflective”; n = 11), or professional attitude such as objectivity and 
unbiased (n = 8) were listed, but also a few negative characteristics like “judgmental” or 
“arrogant” (n = 6). Religiousness was mentioned two times. Three responses did not contain 
any specific content (e.g., “non-existent”).  
 Similarities and differences with other experts. Responses to the third question (N = 
47) were classified according to the comparison group that was mentioned. Most often 




participants named scientists (n = 10), other academics (n = 5) such as philosophers or 
historians, or medical personnel (n = 3). Shared traits with scientists were experience, 
guidelines, knowledgeable, extremely intelligent, and possessing a moral compass. 
Differences were that scientists try to push moral boundaries and can observe change, 
whereas moral experts are bound to guidelines. Similar traits with academics were listed as 
having great knowledge about their respective field and highly intelligent. Differences were 
that academics do not engage in day-to-day issues, or are not as considerate of the needs of 
others. Shared traits with doctors were helping people and are the best in their field. 
Differences were that doctors are primarily concerned with getting people healthy and may 
not care about morality. Other comparison groups were legal personnel and cops (n = 5), or 
religious leaders (n = 4), technicians (n = 3) or others (n = 4). Other responses did not state 
any comparison group or did not mention any similarities or differences (n = 13).   
Groups and professions associated with moral expertise. The last open-ended question 
asked participants to name a group or a profession that they associate with moral expertise (N 
= 116). The majority named religious people or religious institutions (n = 39). Law 
enforcement officers or officials from the judiciary or legislature were named second most 
often (n = 24). Social workers made up the third category (n = 19). Philosophers (n = 8), 
medical personnel (n = 8), or scientists (n = 6) were listed as well. V arious other professions 
like veterans, activists or artists (n = 9) were also associated with moral expertise. Two 
participants responded with “none”.  
 R esponses to rating items. Twelve items assessed a few central characteristics related 
to moral expertise. The results are listed in Table 1. A  degree in philosophy and the reliance 
on intuition were the only two items that were not significantly different from the scale mid-
point (5), t(46) = .05, p > .90, and t(46) = .12, p > .90, respectively). Items with the highest 
score were experience in moral decision-making (t[46] = 7.23, p < .001) and excellent 
knowledge of the human nature (t[46] = 11.56, p < .001).  




- Insert Table 1 about here - 
E ndorsement of belief in moral expertise. The last question asked participants to 
indicate whether or not they believed in the existence of moral expertise: 38% answered yes, 
26% answered no, and 36% were not sure. This suggests that endorsement of belief in moral 
expertise may show some meaningful variation worthwhile further investigations.  
Discussion 
 First of all, answers to the first question show that participants went beyond providing 
a dispositional description (i.e., there were no answers like a moral expert is somebody with 
expertise in morality), as we intended. Together with the second question, the responses 
illustrate that laypeople associate moral expertise with a virtuous character and benign 
behavior towards others. A  certain degree of objectivity, logical thinking and intelligence 
seem to be expected from a moral expert as well. Interestingly, participants did not mention a 
particular training, profession or set of skills as defining feature. Whereas experts are 
commonly defined as extremely knowledgeable, experienced, efficient problem-solvers and 
as determined professionals (Ericsson & Smith, 1991), none of these features were named in 
the context of moral expertise. Only when asked to compare moral experts with experts from 
other domains, similarities and dissimilarities also concentrated on professional or job-
specific behavior and characteristics, such as knowledge, extremely intelligent, and thinking 
about logic. Hence, whereas moral expertise was first and foremost associated with a virtuous 
character other fields of expertise were more strongly associated with specific work-related 
qualities. This distinction emphasizes the uniqueness of this expertise.  
Interestingly, most of the participants named religious people as example for moral 
experts, yet only 1% of the listed characteristics focused on religiosity like piousness. In 
laypeople’s perception religious people are thought to have moral expertise, but being 




religious does not automatically imply moral expertise. The virtuous character that people 
associate with religious people may simply be a common denominator. 
A  bit more than one third of the sample agreed that moral expertise is a real expertise, 
and just as many people were not sure about its existence. This warrants the discussion about 
moral expertise: neither academics of the field (e.g., Rossano, 2008; Schwitzgebel & 
Cushman, 2012; Tobia et al., 2013) nor laypeople are sure if it exists. A lthough participants 
may not be sure about the existence of moral expertise or even indicated that they do not 
believe in it, they still had an idea of what moral expertise might look like and provided 
answers that did not seem to differ much from those participants who do believe in it. The 
sample was not big enough in order to be able to perform a systematic comparison of 
believers versus non-believers. However, everyone and independent of their support of the 
concept, seemed to have an idea about what moral expertise is. Therefore, we assume that 
believing in the concept is not a necessary precondition and people still have an idea about 
what it entails – similarly, non-believers can describe a religion or what belief in God may 
entail without subscribing to these notions themselves.   
In spite of people’s uncertainty about its existence, responses of Study 1 revealed 
important dimensions for moral expertise. First and foremost, a virtuous character seems to 
be a central feature. What laypeople simply call the ability to distinguish right from wrong 
and possessing a moral compass can be compared to the idea that moral expertise develops 
from repeatedly experiencing morally relevant situations in which the problem is assessed 
correctly and the appropriate response is chosen (i.e. habituation; Hulsey & Hampson, 2014). 
In addition, other-oriented behavior is another central characteristic. Since moral expertise 
naturally includes social judgments, the importance of these characteristics is not surprising, 
yet it remains undetermined whether or not these dimensions are especially pronounced in 
moral expertise compared to other domains.  




On the other hand, formal qualifications such as an education, training, above-average 
intelligence, and domain-specific knowledge were named less often as characteristic for moral 
expertise but received some attention when moral expertise was directly compared to other 
expertise. This first indication that formal qualifications are less important for moral expertise 
will be explored further. Additionally, a professional attitude that includes objectivity and 
unbiased judgements forms a fourth dimension that needs clarification.  
Interestingly, analytical thinking received more attention from participants than 
intuitive thinking. Laypeople thus have the expectation that moral experts spend time and 
effort on the decision at hand. This is noteworthy, because researchers still debate whether or 
not moral decisions are based on intuition (Greene & Haidt, 2002; Haidt, 2001) or 
deliberation (Pizarro & Bloom, 2003).  
Study 1 focused on the associations that laypeople have with moral expertise. Using 
the discovered dimensions, the following experimental study investigates whether laypeople’s 
perceptions of these dimensions differ for moral experts compared to other experts. 
Study 2a 
Do laypeople differentiate moral experts from other experts? 
 In order to further explore what makes moral expertise unique, the next study directly 
compares moral expertise with other fields of expertise. Based on Study 1’s findings, we 
designed Study 2a to further explore the relevant dimensions that laypeople use to 
characterize moral experts, and that may differentiate them from experts in other domains. In 
an experimental between-subjects design, we had participants think about a moral expert (or 
an expert from one of three other domains) and provide various judgments about the 
respective expert group. 
Method 
 Participants and design. We recruited 203 adults from MTurk (79 females, 124 
males; MAge = 33.70, SD = 10.42) in exchange for monetary compensation. We included the 




same attention-check item as in Study 1. No participants were excluded from data analysis. 
Participants were randomly assigned to provide judgments about one of four target experts: 
moral expert versus medical expert versus science expert versus philosophy expert.  
 Materials and procedure. Participants were informed that the study is about 
perceptions of expertise. Depending on condition, they were asked to picture a moral expert, a 
medical expert, a science expert, or a philosophy expert. Examples for each expertise 
condition were provided, for instance, in the moral-expert condition the examples included an 
ethicist working in an ethical commission, a religious professional, or a judge. Provided 
examples were based on responses to Study 1. Participants’ first task was to indicate how 
strongly they associate 40 characteristics with the expert group they had been assigned to (1 = 
not strong at all, 9 = extremely strong). Twenty-eight of these items focused on moral 
expertise and were based on the results from Study 1; twelve items (e.g., technical know-how) 
were added to also include expected characteristics typical for other domains of expertise. 
Using a slightly different response format, subsequently, participants were asked to indicate 
their agreement to fifteen descriptions about their expert group, for instance, “They [moral/ 
medical/ science/ philosophy experts] consider the consequences of their decisions” (1 = 
completely disagree, 9 = completely agree). Twelve of these statements reflected participants’ 
responses from Study 1; three statements were about intuitive and deliberative thinking styles, 
and knowledge of human nature.  
 Based on the results from Study 1, we collapsed these items to make up the six 
dimensions on which experts may be differentiated by laypeople: virtuous character (e.g., 
possessing a moral compass, moral character, high standard of conduct; Cronbach’s α  = .90), 
other-oriented behavior (e.g., selflessness, helping, good communication skills; α  = .94), 
formal qualifications (e.g., know-how, educated, credentials; α  = .87), professional attitude 
(e.g., objectivity, professionalism, hard-working; α  = .78), intuitive thinking (e.g., sensing the 
right answer, rely on intuition; α  = .73), and deliberative thinking (e.g., rely on deliberation, 




analytical thinking, thoroughness; α  = .75; see the supplementary materials for a complete list 
of the items). Additionally, participants rated the diversity of the expert’s work and the extent 
to which their work is associated with everyday issues. Finally, participants were asked to 
indicate which kind of expert they had in mind while responding to the questionnaire, which 
served as a manipulation check. 
R esults  
 Manipulation check. The majority of the participants indicated an appropriate 
example for their respective expertise condition. Eleven participants did not provide answers 
that reflected the assigned expertise group. These participants were excluded from further 
analyses. 
 L ay perceptions of characteristics. To investigate how moral experts are perceived 
compared to the other expert groups, we conducted a MONOV A with the six dimensions plus 
the additional two items on work diversity and everyday issues as dependent variables and 
expertise condition as between-subjects variable. Expertise significantly influenced all of the 
assessed dimensions: virtuous character, F (3, 188) = 6.83, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .10; other-oriented 
behavior, F (3, 188) = 9.80, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .14; formal qualifications, F (3, 188) = 22.00, p < 
.001, ηp
2
 = .26; professional attitude, F (3, 188) = 4.58, p = .004, ηp
2
 = .07; intuitive thinking, 
F (3, 188) = 4.88, p = .003, ηp
2
 = .07; deliberative thinking, F (3, 188) = 17.21, p < .001, ηp
2
 = 
.22; work diversity, F (3, 188) = 6.40, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .09; everyday issues, F (3, 188) = 4.68, p 
= .004, ηp
2
 = .07 (Table 2). Post-hoc tests with Bonferroni adjustments for multiple 
comparisons were conducted to further investigate these effects. 
- Insert Table 2 about here - 
 Moral experts versus medical experts. Moral experts and medical experts were rated 
equally high on the dimensions other oriented-behavior, professional attitude, intuitive 
thinking, and everyday issues (all ps > .10), but moral experts were associated with more 




virtuous character (t[95] = 2.77, p = .037, Cohen’s d = 0.54), less formal qualifications (t[95] 
= -5.60, p < .001, d = -1.16), and less deliberative thinking (t[95] = -4.01, p = .001, d = -0.83) 
than were medical experts. A lso, moral experts were associated with less diversity of work 
(t[95] = -3.40, p = .005, d = -0.73). 
 Moral experts versus science experts. Comparing moral experts and science experts 
revealed that both received an equally high rating on the dimension professional attitude and 
the item everyday issues (both ps >.20), but moral experts were again associated with a 
greater virtuous character (t[91] = 3.30, p = .007, d = 0.74), more other-oriented behavior 
(t[91] = 4.45, p < .001, d = 0.86), less formal qualifications (t[91] = -5.32, p < .001, d = -
1.01), less intuitive thinking (t[91] = -2.74, p = .041, d = -0.59), less deliberative thinking 
(t[91] = -5.30, p < .001, d = -1.12), and less work diversity (t[91] = -2.69, p = .046, d = -0.55).  
 Moral experts versus philosophy experts. Moral experts and philosophy experts 
received equally high ratings on the dimensions formal qualification, deliberative thinking, 
everyday issues, and on the item work diversity (all ps > .90). Moral experts were, however, 
associated with a more virtuous character (t[94] = 4.33, p < .001, d = 0.82), more other-
oriented behavior (t[94] = 4.69, p < .001, d = 0.90), slightly more professional attitude (t[94] 
= 2.66, p = .051, d = 0.53), but with less intuitive thinking (t[94] = -3.07, p = .015, d = -0.63). 
Discussion 
 In this study, participants were asked to picture an expert from a given expertise group 
(moral, medical, science or philosophy) and to indicate how strongly they associate various 
characteristics and descriptions with that expertise group. This approach helped to shed light 
on how moral expertise is perceived in comparison to other expertise groups. Most notably, 
differences in virtuous character, other-oriented behavior and formal qualifications emerged. 
Moral experts are more strongly associated with a virtuous character compared to all other 
experts, even compared to another social expertise such as medical personnel. Laypeople may 
use the character to evaluate competence. This is in line with other findings (Stellar & Willer, 




2018) and endorses this character-based approach to moral expertise. On the other hand, 
formal qualifications such as a specific training and a high IQ were more strongly associated 
with medical and scientific experts than with moral or philosophy experts. 
Intuitive and deliberate decision-making styles were not judged as mutually exclusive 
for moral expertise by participants. Whereas for other expertise groups we identified one 
dominant thinking-style (deliberation in medical and science expertise, or intuition in 
philosophy, see Table 2 for means and standard deviations), moral expertise was equally 
strong associated with both intuition and deliberation. In the moral decision-making literature, 
it is also discussed whether moral decisions are based on intuitions or on deliberation (e.g., 
Haidt, 2001; Pizarro & Bloom, 2003). These results emphasize the unique profile of moral 
experts. A  good and caring character as well as advanced social skills and a concern for others 
trump the importance of educational and formal training. Y et, formal qualifications were not 
entirely disregarded either. A lso, similar to other experts, moral experts are expected to judge 
objectively and to leave their personal interest out of the matter. Moral experts work on 
everyday issues, yet, their work does not leave the impression to be very diverse in the eyes of 
a lay person. In principle, it is possible that participants were biased towards the intellectualist 
model by the provided examples, since all of the examples represent a profession that 
involves education and training. However, the results do not reflect this. A  virtuous character 
combined with other-oriented behavior received the highest importance ranking, formal 
qualification was less important. Thus, it seems rather unlikely that participants’ responses 
were biased in a particular direction. 
 Furthermore, the present results show that laypeople do not ascribe the same 
characteristics, qualification or task description to both moral and philosophy experts. 
Philosophy experts scored lower on virtuous character items and lower on other-oriented 
behavior, but this social element seems to be a requirement for moral expertise. Consequently, 




philosophers may not be perceived as moral experts by laypeople, as has been suggested 
elsewhere (Archard, 2011; Gordon, 2014; Schwitzgebel & Cushman, 2012; Singer, 1972).  
A  profession that involves the interaction with other people and whose members were 
also listed as possible candidates for moral expertise is the judiciary or law enforcement. But 
how do legal experts define moral expertise, do they think of themselves as moral experts, and 
do their conceptualizations match those of laypeople’s? We designed the next study to address 
these questions and gain insights from the perspective of moral experts themselves. 
Study 2b 
Do legal experts consider themselves to be moral experts? 
In Study 1, participants listed examples of moral experts which included legal 
professionals. Judges face and evaluate moral transgressions on a daily basis, providing them 
with a unique possibility to develop decision-making skills in the moral domain. This regular 
routine should also provide professional judges with the extensive amount of experience 
required for the development of expertise (Ericsson et al., 1993). Again, since expertise 
performance simply cannot be measured by decision outcomes, the same folk-psychological 
method as in the previous studies was applied. Thus, how do the judges perceive themselves? 
Do they share the laypeople’s perception of moral expertise? A lso, judges are highly educated 
and trained. If they do perceive themselves as moral experts, this could provide support for 
the intellectualist model. A lternatively, if they indicate that a moral character or other-
oriented behavior is needed just as much as their formal training, this would support the 
holistic view: both parts are required.  Hence, extending Study 2a, a sample of legal experts 
rated themselves on the same items as in Study 2a in order to compare their self-reported set 
of characteristics to the profile generated by laypeople.  
Methods 
Participants and design. We recruited 27 judges (9 females, 17 males, one 
unidentified; Mage = 44.24, SD = 10.30). They had an average of 15.46 years of experience on 




the bench (SD = 10.41). The majority indicated that they are civil-law judges (n = 18), some 
criminal-law judges (n = 4), and others labor-law judges (n = 4). One participant did not 
indicate his area of specialization. A ll participants received the identical questionnaire.  
Materials and procedure. Participants were recruited during a conference at the 
German Academy of Judges (Deutsche Richterakademie). They were informed that laypeople 
had listed judges as an example for moral experts, and that they, therefore, are considered to 
be moral experts by the public. Participants then indicated how important the characteristics 
from the previous study are for their jobs. Participants saw a German translation of the 55 
items from Study 2a (nine-point Likert-type scale: 1 = not strong at all, 9 = extremely strong, 
or 1 = completely disagree, 9 = completely agree). Additionally, belief in the existence of 
moral expertise, as well as personal opinion about whether or not they see themselves as 
moral experts, were assessed (1 = completely disagree, 9 = completely agree). Finally, they 
were asked to indicate whom they would consider to be a moral expert. 
R esults and Discussion  
One-sample t-tests indicated that scores on all dimensions were significantly above the 
scale midpoint (5), all ts > 4, all ps < .001 (see Table 2 for the descriptive statistics), with the 
highest rating for professional attitude (t[26] = 18.18, p < .001). None of the dimensions was 
rated as unimportant for their job, implying that a diverse skill set is needed for their 
profession. However, legal experts’ belief in the existence of moral expertise was not 
significantly different from the scale’s midpoint (M = 4.22, SD = 2.49), t(26) = -1.63, p > .10. 
They also did not consider themselves moral experts (M = 3.63, SD = 2.19), t(26) = -3.26, p = 
.003. Y et, the more the legal experts believed in the existence of moral expertise, the more 
they thought that a virtuous character is important for their current job, r(25) = .581, p = .001, 
and the more they thought formal qualifications were important, r(25) = .376, p = .054. 
Again, this points towards a holistic view of moral expertise, implying that virtuous character 
and formal qualifications are not mutually exclusive. A lso, the more they believed in the 




existence of moral expertise, the more they thought of themselves as moral experts, r(25) 
=.766, p < .01.  
When asked to name possible moral experts (50 response units), the majority (n = 22) 
mentioned various clergy members (e.g., priest, imam, nun). Nine units mentioned members 
from the judiciary (e.g., judges), six mentioned philosophers, three medical personnel, and ten 
various other groups (e.g., journalists, teachers). Two participants left this item unanswered. 
In summary, even judges have difficulty to narrow down moral expertise to a specific set of 
qualities or even to one profession. Since this Study had a limited participant sample, more 
studies should be conducted about how so-called moral experts perceive themselves.  
Study 3 
How much formal qualification and virtuous character do laypeople expect from moral 
experts? 
So far, our studies show that laypeople associate slightly different characteristics with 
a moral expert compared to experts from other fields. Specifically, formal qualification that is 
acquired through education, training and experience (Ericsson et al., 1993) is not regarded the 
strongest requirement for moral expertise. Instead, a virtuous character combined with other-
oriented behavior differentiates moral experts from other experts. Still, this does not imply 
that moral expertise is entirely about virtue that develops through habituation (Hulsey & 
Hampson, 2014; Narvaez, 2010; Narvaez & Gleason, 2007; Narvaez & Lapsley, 2005), 
because formal qualification was not rated as a completely unimportant feature. Rather, it 
seems that laypeople require both features to some degree when thinking of moral experts, 
with a slightly stronger focus on a virtuous character, compared to other expert groups.  
The aim of this final study was to determine how much virtuous character, and how 
much formal qualification a moral expert should have in the eyes of a lay person, because the 
relative contribution of both characteristics compared to other expert groups remains unclear. 




In the present study, we chose to compare moral experts with medical experts, because both 
expert groups are associated with a strong social component.  
Based on the previous findings, we hypothesized that laypeople would judge a 
virtuous character to be of greater importance than formal qualifications for moral experts, 
whereas we expected the reversed pattern for medical experts, for whom formal qualifications 
should be judged as more important than a virtuous character. Finally, we anticipated that the 
difference between both judgments of importance would be smaller for moral experts 
compared to medical experts, thus signifying a more balanced evaluation of both 
characteristics for moral experts.  
Method 
 Participants and design. We recruited 298 adults from MTurk (159 females, 136 
males, 3 other; MAge = 34.93, SD = 10.99) in exchange for monetary compensation. We 
included a similar attention-check item as in previous studies. Eleven participants failed this 
attention-check item and were excluded from data analysis
1
. In a within-subjects design, all 
participants made judgments regarding moral experts and medical experts. Order of the two 
expert groups was counterbalanced across participants.  
Materials and procedure. Participants were asked to picture experts from two 
different domains and to indicate how much of a certain characteristic the respective expert 
should have. First, participants saw examples of moral and medical experts, respectively, 
(moral: an ethicist working in an ethical commission, a religious professional or a judge; 
medical: a surgeon, a doctor, or a nurse). Next, participants indicated how much of the 
following characteristic the moral (medical) expert should have from 0 to 100 with a total of 
100. The two characteristics were “virtuous character” and “formal qualifications”. For each 
characteristic, examples were provided (virtuous character: patient, good role model, honest, 
                                                          
1
 Prior to this study, participants completed an unrelated survey, including a between-subjects manipulation that 
did not produce any significant effects on the items of the present studies. 




wise; formal qualifications: educated, highly knowledgeable, intelligent, experienced). 
Participants received an error message if their responses did not add up to 100. 
R esults and Discussion 
In order to determine the relative contribution of a virtuous character in comparison 
with formal qualifications in moral experts compared to other expert groups, the proportions 
of responses for virtuous character were determined for both groups. Results of a paired 
sample t-test indicated that the proportion of responses for virtuous character were greater for 
the moral experts (M = .58, SD = .17) than for the medical experts (M = .32, SD = .17), t(284) 
= 20.91, p < .000, d = 1.24).  
Consistent with our hypothesis that a virtuous character is considered an important yet 
not the sole characteristic of moral experts, results of this last study show that laypeople 
indicate that for moral experts, the ratio between virtuous character and formal qualifications 
should be approximately 60-40. In contrast, for medical expert, laypeople indicate that this 
ratio should be 30-70. Not only is this a reversed pattern, but the difference between virtuous 
character and formal qualification is much smaller for moral than for medical experts. This 
further supports the previous results that it is neither virtue nor education alone that define 
moral expertise as the ongoing debate might suggest, but that in the eyes of laypeople, both 
features are necessary.  
General Discussion 
 “Believe one who has proved it. Believe an expert.” A lthough the Roman poet V irgil 
did not provide an extensive definition of expertise, he does mention a very specific feature: 
expertise is something you earn. But how is expertise earned in a domain that neither has a 
specific training nor provides performance feedback? Moral expertise is a prime example for 
this puzzling phenomenon. The present research adds a laypeople’s perspective to the 
discussion of moral expertise by addressing how ordinary people construe this kind of 
expertise.  




 Study 1 revealed that moral experts are not only judged along performance 
dimensions (e.g., having knowledge about the domain), but on their personality as well (e.g., 
having a kind heart). Studies 2a and 3 corroborated this lay conception of moral expertise by 
indicating that participants regard both, formal qualification and virtuous character, as key 
ingredients that distinguish moral experts from other types of experts (e.g., medical experts). 
Overall, the present results suggest a more holistic view of moral expertise, such that 
laypeople seem to expect a more diverse set of characteristics from a moral expert than from 
other kinds of experts.   
T heoretical and Practical Contributions 
The present research contributes to the ongoing debate about moral expertise by 
adding a folk-psychological perspective. Particularly, it suggests that laypeople do not 
consider any of the previously discussed characteristics as sufficient, but that they entertain a 
more complex view on what constitutes a moral expert. Furthermore, Study 2b hints at a 
possible discrepancy between the public’s perception of a moral expert and what the moral 
expert thinks about him- or herself. Within the moral domain, it is not new that philosophers, 
laypeople or moral experts have different views on the same issue, for instance, some moral 
topics such as abortion laypeople may not be regarded as an ethical issue at all by some 
laypeople, whereas philosophers overwhelmingly do or are in much more disagreement about 
the issue (Wright, Grandjean, & McWhite, 2013). A lso, laypeople are more confident that 
correct answers to some moral questions exist (Beebe & Sackris, 2016). Hence, laypeople, as 
well as moral experts themselves, can provide insights regarding the nature of moral expertise 
that may otherwise be overlooked. 
Furthermore, our findings are well in line with recent person-centered approaches to 
moral judgment (for an overview, see Uhlmann, Pizarro, & Diermeier, 2015). Whereas much 
of the previous research has focused on the moral permissibility of acts (e.g., whether actions 
violate moral principles or maximize overall outcomes), people in fact seem to be naïve virtue 




theorists. Specifically, laypeople often observe and judge behavior of others in order to 
determine their moral character. As the present research indicates, such a primacy of character 
may be particularly important for expertise in the moral domain. Consistently, even children 
understand the value of character traits and prefer moral advice from a person capable of 
comprehending emotions––as opposed to an intellectually superior machine, for example 
(Danovitch & K eil, 2008). Insofar as laypeople are intuitive virtue theorists who put great 
emphasis on moral traits such as integrity and empathy for others, they seem to hold moral 
experts to these high standards as well. 
J ones and Schroeter (2012) named two models of defining moral expertise, the 
intellectualist model and the practical wisdom model. Certainly, there are other approaches as 
well. For instance, according to philosopher John Searle, something or someone can have a 
formal or an informal status (Searle, 1995). This is a similar yet not identical distinction as the 
one made by the intellectualist and practical wisdom models. A  formal status implies 
constitutive rules such as a certain education or training, and a certificate. Informal implies 
that society has simply accepted a person to be an expert on that matter, yet, there are no rules 
when or even why this collective intentionality happened.  
At first sight, moral expertise seems to fit the informal status description, whereas 
other forms of expertise are of formal status. However, if the research aim is not only about 
finding out whom laypeople accept as moral expert, but about their characteristics and the 
development of expertise, a model that is more detailed in this regard is needed. Within the 
present topic, the formal-informal distinction is thus more about society’s acceptance of 
somebody as a moral expert, whereas the practical wisdom model, for instance, emphasizes 
the development of moral expertise. Here, habituation is responsible, which is the repeated 
confrontation with moral situations and the finding of solutions. Furthermore, the used 
methodology of the present studies contradicts a clear assignment of moral expertise as an 
informal status, because the examples that were provided for moral experts also included 




formally recognized experts such as priests or judges. Second, participants also named some 
aspects that imply a formal status such as education. Perhaps, formal and informal are not 
exclusive, but could be seen as a dimension, with moral expertise being somewhere in the 
middle, but leaning towards an informal status. Either way, the intellectualist model and the 
practical wisdom model were used as starting points in an empirically still developing 
research field. 
L imitations and Directions for Future R esearch 
 Studies 1 through 2b were of rather explorative nature and represent the first empirical 
attempt to illuminate how laypeople and so-called moral experts think about moral expertise. 
Consistent with our confirmatory approach in Study 3, future research might focus on 
additional characteristics to gain a more complete picture of what constitutes moral expertise. 
Additionally, Study 2a is limited to the comparison with three other types of expertise (i.e., 
philosophy, science, medicine). Therefore, it remains unclear whether or not moral expertise 
is unique or only unique compared to these other expertise groups. Furthermore, the expert 
sample of Study 2b was small and limited to legal professionals. Future research should 
survey other expertise groups such as religious leaders, philosophers, or law enforcement 
officers.  
A lso,  a limitation of the present studies was that moral expertise was approached as if 
only one prototypical moral expert exists – not in the sense of a profession, but the studies did 
not differentiate between somebody like Dr. Dr. Erlinger (a moral coach) or somebody like 
John McCain (a moral virtuoso). The provided examples in Studies 2a and 3 (i.e., religious 
leader, ethicist or judge) were designed to cover a great variety of possibilities, but it was left 
to the participant to choose what specific exemplar of a moral expert – if any – he or she 
thought of while answering the questionnaire. If participants had somebody like Erlinger in 
mind, this would explain answers that focused on advice-giving and objectivity, and also 
empathy or analytical thinking. On the other hand, some people may have thought about a 




virtuous person, somebody who behaves exceptionally well and might be perceived as a 
moral exemplar. This would explain why some participants responded that a moral expert 
should have a great character, should be a moral person and a great role model. It could also 
be that participants switched back and forth between moral coach and moral virtuoso within 
the same study, depending on which question they were answering. This could also have 
contributed to the greater variability of features associated with moral expertise compared to other 
types of expertise. 
Whereas this distinction between moral coach and moral virtuoso was not the focus of 
the present research, it is something that should be investigated in the future. It could be 
argued that a moral coach and a moral virtuoso are two very different things and seeing them 
as one entity (by asking participants to think of moral experts) might limit people’s 
perspective on the matter. However, we would hypothesize that it is not easy to clearly 
separate the two types of moral expertise. It could be that a moral coach does not need to act 
morally him/herself in order to provide sound advice, or that a moral virtuoso could be 
terrible in giving moral advice, but we think that laypeople have difficulty differentiating the 
two. A  tennis coach is of course assumed to be good at tennis. A  math professor is assumed to 
be good in math and––at least to a higher degree than a math novice––also expected to be able to 
teach the matter. Therefore, even if these two are not interdependent, we assume that the 
majority of laypeople have difficulty to separate the two.  
Beyond that, exploring both antecedents as well as the consequences of beliefs in 
moral expertise could substantially contribute to the understanding of moral expertise. Thus 
far, we know little about why some people believe in moral expertise and others do not or are 
unsure, or how the belief in moral expertise relates to other prominent beliefs such as 
religious beliefs or belief in science. Consistently, research on the consequences of beliefs in 
moral expertise might investigate when laypeople seek moral advice and whom they would 
contact. Do they accept the moral advice more willingly if the expert has the formal 




qualifications, is virtuous or fulfills both? The present research suggests that advice seekers 
might have more complex expectations towards moral experts than other kinds of experts. 
Addressing these and other open questions may eventually lead to a more complete picture of 
what moral expertise is and help answer questions such as why ordinary readers of a news 
magazine turn to a doctor of medicine and law to have him figure out the most pressing moral 
issues of their daily lives. 
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Descriptive Statistics of rating items of Study 1 
 N Min Max M SD 
excellent knowledge of human nature 50 2 9 7.76 1.57 
experience in moral decision-making 50 1 9 7.42 2.17 
broad general knowledge 50 1 9 7.16 2.04 
efficient information processing skills 50 2 9 7.10 2.09 
rely on deliberation 50 1 9 6.84 2.12 
overall good personality 50 1 9 6.74 2.43 
politically neutral 50 1 9 6.62 2.54 
highly educated 50 1 9 6.54 2.38 
integrated into society 50 1 9 6.30 2.43 
above average IQ 50 1 9 5.74 2.52 
degree in philosophy 50 1 9 5.06 2.71 
rely on intuition 50 1 9 5.04 2.40 
V alid N  50     
Note: Importance rating of moral experts’ characteristics (1 = not important at all, 9 = very 
important), displayed in descending order of importance.  






Descriptive Statistics of Studies 2a (N = 192) and 2b (N = 27) 
Study 2a  Study 2b 
 
Moral Medical Science Philosophy  
Characteristic M SD M SD M SD M SD  M SD 
V irtuous character 7.41 1.26 6.79 1.13 6.65 0.88 6.43 1.20  6.38 0.71 
Other-oriented behavior 7.66 1.16 7.15 1.13 6.56 1.08 6.52 1.37  6.60 0.90 
Formal qualifications 6.82 1.16 8.00 0.85 7.96 1.09 6.72 1.04  6.83 0.87 
Professional attitude 7.10 0.92 6.88 0.87 7.26 0.96 6.60 0.95  7.15 0.61 
Intuition 6.26 1.24 6.38 1.31 6.94 1,07 7.01 1.12  5.94 1.10 
Deliberation 6.53 1.13 7.41 0.98 7.72 1.00 6.40 1.20  6.52 0.83 
Work diversity 5.78 1.94 7.10 1.64 6.85 1.91 5.80 2.08  7.89 1.05 
Everyday issues  7.43 1.44 7.28 1.43 6.74 1.72 6.37 1.69  7.19 1.36 
Note: Participants of Study 2a were lay participants recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk; participants of Study 2b were legal experts recruited from the German Academy of 
Judges.  
 
